











V 












*v 















\ 

\ 

i 

/ 

) 

Proportional ^ 0 

Representation 

1 



By JOHN R. COMMONS. 

S % 




I 


When Elbridge Gerry was elected governor of Massa¬ 
chusetts in 1811, his party enacted a law providing for 
a new division of the sta’te into senatorial districts, so 
contrived that in as many districts as possible the Fed¬ 
eralists should be outnumbered by their opponents. 
Gilbert Stuart, the artist, seeing in a newspaper office 
an outline of the Essex outer district, nearly encircling 
the balance of the county, added with his pencil a beak 
to Salisbury, and claws to Salem and Marblehead, ex¬ 
claiming, "‘There, that will do for a salamander.” 
“SALAMANDER,” said the editor, ‘‘I call it a 
GERRYMANDER.” 


' 


publishers: 

APPEAL TO REASON, GIRARD, KANSA8, 1902. 

PRICE, IOC. 
12 FOE $1.00. 















































CHESTE3 

FIELD 


yFAIRFIELI 


KERSHAI 


iCWBERR] 


ABBEVILLI 


SUMTER 


HORRY 


.£ D G E Fit L D#l E XINOTOJ 


.ORANGE ffiURl 


v *“«. 

BERKELEY 


COL&LETON 


Congressional .*. Districts, 


Soutt) Carolina, wo. 


An illustration of “ compact and contiguous territory.” 

A gerrymander so contrived as to bunch the mi¬ 
nority party into one district and to give the majority 
party six districts . ...... 


/' n york . 

. 2 >- k 


h \ 


* y ,11 r- / m 

'y/ogSfrA 

VVQ /%LAL 


DARLING-/ \ \ 

i ton /^\MARI0N 


2 r ✓ 




.</ ^ 
V BARNWELL 

\ 2 ., 

















M :BOOKS M 


- OJW - 

proportional & 


pepre^ptation. 


PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, 

By John R. Commons, 298 pages, $1.75. 

T. Y. Crowell & Co., New Yor%, 1896. 


La DEMOCRATIE et VELECTION 
PROPORTIONELLE, 


B y Nicolas Saripotos, Professor of LaW at 
the University of Paris; 2 Vo Is., 
Paris, 1899. 











THE GERRYMANDER, 


P ROPORTIONAL Representation consists in abolishing the 
present district system o£, electing a single representative 
'< by& m4Joi*Ity{or ^luhality- vptg, and in enlarging the dis- 
tri.ct^ XohtTiat' five "to thiffy °or more candidates shall be 
elected on a general .ticket. ,Thi^ snakes it possible to ap¬ 
portion th,e successful candidates amon*g ( the several parties in ex¬ 
act proportion to. their - popular vote. *The existing single-mem- 
bered district violates proportionality a,nd equality in a most ag¬ 
gravating way. It is the basis of the gerrymander. The gerry¬ 
mander is an arrangement of election districts by the party in 
power in such a way as to give the opposite party large majori¬ 
ties in a smail number of districts and the guilty party small ma¬ 
jorities in a large number of districts. Sometimes the party mis¬ 
calculates. The gerrymander does not always work as intend¬ 
ed. Even where there is no gerrymander the system of single- 
membered districts has a large element of accident. There are 
always a number of close districts, and the change of a very few 
votes along the entire line may change the election from one party 
to another far in excess of the actual change in the popular vote. 
The following examples, out of many which might be offered, 
show the gerrymanders and accidents of the plurality system, and 
the change which would be brought about by proportional rep¬ 
resentation. 


HOW THE PRESENT SYSTEM WORKS. 


In 1894 the congressional vote in Ohio was 407,371 Repubhca i 
and 274,670 Democratic. This entitled the Republicans to twelve 





— 3 — 


representatives, the Democrats to seven and the Populists to one. 
Yet the Republicans elected nineteen and the Democrats only two 
and the Populists none. According to the result of the election, 
one Republican voter in Ohio was equal to six Democratic voters, 
since it took 137,335 Democrats to elect one congressman and only 
21,440 Republicans to elect one congressman. 

In the election of 1900 in Ohio the Republicans cast 51% of 
the votes and the Democrats 44%, yet the Republicans elected 
seventeen congressmen and the Democrats only four. The Re¬ 
publicans elected sixty-eight members of the State House and the 
Democrats only forty-two, whereas, had the election been propor¬ 
tional, the Republicans would have elected only fifty-six mem¬ 
bers and minor parties six members. 

Missouri, in 1900, cast 51% of its votes for Bryan and 46% 
for McKinley, yet the Democrats elected thirteen congressmen 
and the Republicans only two. The Democratic legislature has 
since then improved on this result, and the new gerrymander is 
expected to elect only one Republican. In 1900 the Democrats 
elected 62% of the state legislature and the Republicans only 
38%. 

Illinois, in 1900, cast 53% of its votes for McKinley and 44% 
for Bryan, and the Republicans and Democrats elected eleven 
congressmen each. In 1902, if the people vote exactly as they did 
in 1900, the Republican gerrymander has fixed the districts so 
that the Republicans will elect nineteen congressmen and the 
Democrats six. In the state house of representatives, (the only 
legislature in the United States elected by the cumulative vote, a 
crude kind of proportional representation), the membership was 
almost exactly proportional to the popular vote, namely, 53% 
Republicans and 47% Democrats. 

The city of New York, in 1898, elected a solid delegation of 
Democrats to congress. By the proportional method the Demo¬ 
crats would have elected nine and the Republicans seven. In 1900, 
when the Republicans gained enough votes to haye elected e 4 gat 
against eight of the Democrats, they actually elected only iour 
against the Democrats’ twelve. 

The existing plurality system is especially unjust to small 
parties. If representative government is ba,sed on equal suffrage, 


4- 


then the small parties have as much right to representation in 
proportion to their numbers as the large parties. Small parties 
are often the symptom of healthy revolt against the bosses of the 
large parties. At present the voters do not turn to any of these 
parties because they are afraid of “throwing their votes away.*' 
Under the proportional system they could not possibly throw their 
votes away, and therefore the bosses would lose control. The re¬ 
volt against boss rule shows itself with greatest emphasis in the 
city of New York. In 1892, Tammany Hall, with 59% of the votes, 
elected every one of the thirty aldermen. In 1897, with '48% of 
the votes, Tammany elected 86 % of the Borough council of Man¬ 
hattan and Bronx (corresponding to former New York.) Follow¬ 
ing is the vote and the actual as compared with the proportional 
result: 

ELECTION OF ALDERMEN FOR THE BOROUGHS OF MAN¬ 
HATTAN AND BRONX.—1897. 


(The vote is that cast for Mayor.) 



Votes 

Per Cent. 

Elected. 

Propor¬ 

tional. 

Tammany . 

143,766 

48 

31 

17 

Citizen’s Union . 

77,210 

26 

4 

IO 

Republican.. 

55,834 

19 

1 

7 

Jeffersonian Democrat .. 

13,076 

4 


2 

SocialivSt 

9,796 

3 



Scattering. 

L357 





300,939 

100 

36 

36 


In 1897, Tammany Hall, with less than half of the votes, 
elected 90% of the councilmen. Tammany’s representation was 
26 out of a total 29 members—a majority of 23. By the propor¬ 
tional method it would have been 13—a minority of 3. 























—5— 


ELECTION OF COUNCILMEN—NEW YORK, 1897. 
(The vote is that cast for Mayor.) 



Number. 

Per Cent, 

Actual Rep 

Propor¬ 
tional Rep 

Democrat. 

2 33,997 

44 

26 

13 

Citizens’ Union 

151,540 

29 


9 

Republican 

101,863 

. 19 


6 

Citizens’ Union and Repub . . 

3 


Jeffersonian Democrat 

21,692 

4 


I 

Socialist 

14,467 

3 



Scattering 

2,999 

1 







Total 

526,599 

100 

29 

29 


The election of a.ldermen for Greater New York by the same 
methods of computation is equally interesting. Tammany 
elected 47 out of 60—a majority of 34. Proportionally Tammany 
would have elected only 28—a minority of four. The Citizens’ 
Union would have elected 18 instead of two; the Republicans 12 
instead of 9; the Jeffersonian Democracy 2 instead of none. 

Elections in the Southern states have but little significance, 
since the Republican vote is almost wholly suppressed, being 7% 
in South Carolina, 10% in Mississippi, 29% in Georgia, and so on. 
Yet even on the basis of the votes actually cast, the Republicans 
in Georgia, should have elected 3 of the 11 congressmen instead 
of none, and 50 of the 175 members of the state house, instead of 
9. The Republicans in Mississippi should have elected 1 member 
of congress instead of none, and 13 members of the state house 
instead of none. 

The plurality system forces minor parties to join together on 
a fusion ticket. Sometimes 'bis is successful, as in New York, in 
1901, when the Republicans md Citizens’ Union joined forces and 
elected the mayor. But fusion is lull of dangers. It is a mitter 
of “deals” and trading. Who knows what has been given and 
what has been promised? The results of the fusion method in 
the elections of 1898 are notable. In Kansas, in the state election 
of that year, the Republicans cast 149,853 (gubernatorial vote), 

































— 6 — 


and the Fusionists 133,983, yet, under the present system, the Re¬ 
publicans got 7 congressmen and the Fusionists only l. Under 
proportional representation the majorities and minorities would 
be represented in proportion to their votes. The vote and repre¬ 
sentation in detail are as follows: 

KANSAS ELECTION, 1898. 


State Vote Representatives in 

State House. Congress. 

Republicans . 149,853 90 7 

Fusionists. 133 >983 32 1 

State Vote Representatives in 

State Senate. House. Congress 
Republicans.... 236,524 38 62 n 

Fusionist. 137,000 12 38 o 

One Kansas Republican in congress to each 21,000 Republican 
votes. 

One Kansas Fusionist in congress to each* 133,983 Fusion 
votes. 


One Republican state senator to each 1,670 Republican votes. 
One Democrat and Populist senator to each 4,156 votes. 

In Iowa in 1898, the case between the Republicans anft the 
Fusionists wa*s as follows: 

IOWA ELECTION, 1898. 

.State Vote Representatives in 


State Senate. House. Congress. 

Republicans. 476,206 37 127 20 

Democrats. 358,300 13 71 10 

Prohi. and Pop. 

Fusionists..... 127,804 o 60 


One Iowa Republican in congress to each 22,400 Republican 
votes. 

No Iowa Democrat or Populist in congress to 173,000 Demo¬ 
cratic and Populist votes. 

One Iowa Republican in the state senate to each 6,224 votes. 

One Democrat and Populist in the state senate to each 14,423 
votes. 

In Pennsylvania, in 1898, it required 21,300 Populist and Pro¬ 
hibition Fusionists to elect one member of the lower house; 5,040 










Democrats to elect one member; and only 3,750 Republicans to 
elect one member. The Republicans elected a majority of fifty 
over both Democrats and Fusionists; but by proportional repre¬ 
sentation the republicans would ha,ve been in a minority. The 
Republicans elected one congressman for every 23,800 votes; the 
Democrats one for every 35,800 votes, and the Fusionists hone for 
127,800 votes. Following is the vote: 

PENNSYLVANIA ELECTION, 1898. 

State Vote. Representatives in 

State Senate, House. Congress. 

Republicans___ _ 426,206 37 127 20 

Democrats . . ... 358,300 13 71 10 

Prohibitionists and Populist 

Fusionists __ 127,804 o 60 

The Ohio election of 1899 is a telling instance of the need of 
proportional representation. On the vote for governor the Repub¬ 
licans cast but 45% of the votes, yet elected 56% of the lower 
house of the legislature. The Democrats and the Jones Social¬ 
ists were unajde to fuse, yet if they could have elected the lower 
house in proportion to their,vote for governor, the Republicans 
would have been in a minority of 10 instead of a majority of 14. 
The following is the vote and the actual result, compared with 
the proportional result. The senate is not properly included, 
since half of the senators are holdovers: 


OHIO ELECTION, 1899. 



Vote for 
Governor. 

State legislature. 

Senate. 

1 

House. 

Actual 

Propor¬ 

tional. 

Actual. 

Propor¬ 

tional. 

Republican (Nash) 

417199 

368176 

106721 

19 

9 

1 

14 

12 

3 

62 

45 

3 

50 

46 

14 

Democrat (McLean) 

Non-partisan (Jones)... 

892096 

29 

29 

IIO 

IIO 


More glaring than ajl is the inequality of the Nebraska elec¬ 
tion of 1899. The Fusionists elected the head of the state ticket 
by 15,000 majority, yet the Republicans elected a majority of 19 






















in the lower house. Had proportional representation been in 
force, the Fusionists would have elected a majority of 10 instead 
of a minority of 19. The sta,te senate shows similar inequality, 
although the presence of holdover senators clouds the contrast. 
Following is the vote and results. Surely Nebraska does not have 
representative government when a minority party elects a ma¬ 
jority of the legislature, and thereby gets the United States sen¬ 
ator: 


NEBRASKA ELECTION, 1899. 




Representatives in State 
legislature. 


Vote for 






Supreme 

Court 

Judge. 

Senate. 

House. 



Actual. 

Propor¬ 

tional. 

Actual. 

Propor¬ 

tional, 

Fusion 

109 ,J 2 G 

94,213 

11 

T 7 

45 

65 

60 

Rep 

20 

L / 

JA 

50 





203,533 

31 

31 

no 

no 


Proportional representation, by abolishing the district system 
of election, will give to each political party its just share of rep¬ 
resentation in congress, the legislature and all deliberate bodies. 


THE SINGLE-MEMBERED DISTRICT PREVENTS FREEDOM 

OF CHOICE. 

Proportional representation cannot be secured where but one 
candidate is elected in a district. He is the representative of the 
majority and not of all. The single-membered district system, 
which is almost universal in the election of representatives, is an 
historical accident, and not a rational device for representation 
or. modern lines. In feudal and colonial times, when it was 
adopted, it happened that each organized interest lived by itself 
in a given territory. Each guild of hand workers ha.d its own 
ward in the town, and therefore the alderman of the shoe-makers 




















— 9 — 


happened to be the alderman of the shoe-makers’ ward. Suffrage 
was limited to those who belonged to the guild. Also the farmers 
were only farm owners and not farm laborers. Now, when 
suffrage is universal, ward and district lines have lost their mean¬ 
ing. The single representative elected in a district is voted for 
by different interests, as already shown, and the results a,re un- 
rt presentative government. 


PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION REQUIRES LARGER 

DISTRICTS. 

By proportional representation it is proposed to abolish alto¬ 
gether ward and district lines for purposes of election,- and to com¬ 
bine existing si'ngle-membered districts into larger districts, 
electing from 5 to 35 representatives each. The canton of Geneva,, 
Switzerland, having adopted this system, is divided into three dis¬ 
tricts, each electing 25 to 40 councilmen. Other cantons and cities 
have smaller districts, but whatever the size, it is essential that 
at least five members be elected from a, single district. This Will 
usually secure proportionality as far as needed in American elec¬ 
tions. Members of Congress for each state would be elected on 
a general ticket for the state at large, like presidential electors, 
a,nd not by districts. This would amount to from one to 35 can¬ 
didates on a single ticket. The state senate, composed of 35 to 
50 members could be elected on one ticket for the state at large. 

The lower house can be elected in districts of 5 to 10 members 

* 

by consolidating just so many of the present single-membered 
districts. The Board of Aldermen and Board of Education can be 
elected on a general ticket for the entire city, just as boards of 
education are some times elected at the present time. The county 
commissioners can be elected on a general ticket for the entire 
county, just as the commissioners of Cook county, Illinois, (Chi¬ 
cago) are now elected. 



— 10 — 


THE GENERAL TICKET ELECTED BY A PLURALITY EX¬ 
CLUDES MINORITIES. 

The foregoing examples show that the American people ate 
familiar with the general ticket. It consists simply in electing 
more than one man to the same office on the same ticket. The 
voter has as many votes as there are candidates to be Elected and 
can give but one vote to one candidate. By this means the ma¬ 
jority party usually elects all its candidates and the minority par¬ 
ties elect none. 

The difference between this method and proportional repre¬ 
sentation can be shown in the election of presidential electors, and 
for that purpose I ta^ke the following returns from Indiana in the 
election of 1892: 


VOTE FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS—INDIANA, 1892. 


Number of 
Candidate. 

Democrat. 

Republican. 

People’s. 

Prohibition. 

I 

262,270* 

255,615* 

22,208* 

12,050 

II 

260,661* 

253,878* 

21,861 

12,830 

III 

260,600* 

253,836* 

21,883 

12,826 

IV 

260,586 

253,815* 

21,876 

12,824 

V . 

260,580 

253 , 799 * 

21,873 

12,823 

VI.. 

260,560 

253,807* 

21,872 

12.821 

VII 

260,588* 

253,793 

21,873 

12,821 

VIII 

260,547 

253,808* 

21,865 

12,820 

IX . 

260,545 

253,787 

21,873 

12,820 

X. 

260,600* 

253,792 

21,871 

12,819 > 

XI 

260,591* 

253,777 

21,867 

12,813 

XII 

260,590* 

253,767 

21,867 

12,820 

XIII .. 

260,581 

252,767 

21,864 

12,819 

XIV.. 

260,538 

253,770 

• 21,864 

12,816 

XV . .... 

260,533 

253,770 

21,854 

12,815 


3,910,390 

3,808,791 

328,392 

192,523 


It appears from this election that each voter had fifteen votes 
which he could distribute as he chose, giving not more than one 
vote for one candidate. He usually voted a straight ticket by 
marking the party column at the top. This is counted as one vote 
for each candidate of that party. There are four parties with fif¬ 
teen candidates each, or sixty in all, and according to the plaji 
of the general ticket the fifteen candidates were declared elected 

























—11 


whose individual votes were the highest. Since the voters nearly 
all voted “straight tickets,” every one of the fifteen democrats re¬ 
ceived individually more votes than any one of the other candi¬ 
dates. Consequently, the fifteen democrats were declared elected, 
and the other parties were unrepresented in the state's Electoral 
College, although the Democratic voters were less tha'n a majority 
of the whole. 


PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION IS A MODIFICATION OF 
THE GENERAL TICKET. 

If, now, this election were to be held under the rules of pro¬ 
portional representation, the voters, as far as they are concerned, 
would mark their ballots in exactly the same way. Each voter 
•would have fifteen votes which he could distribute as he chose, 
giving not more than one vote to one candidate. He could vote a 
“straight Ticket” or a mixed ticket, exactly as he did in 1892. As 
far as the voter is concerned, proportional representation makes 
no difference whatever with his ballot, and his duty is exactly as 
simple and as easy as at present. This is an important consid¬ 
eration in advocating any reform, since the task of the ordinary 
voter should be kept as simple as possible. Any voter who can 
vote the Australian ballot can vote a Proportioinal Representa¬ 
tion ballot, because there is no difference whatever in the way he 
marks his ballot. The only difference consists in counting the 
votes. This is not done by the voters, but by the election officers, 
and is a very simple problem in the rule of three. The total vote 
is as follows: 


Democrat. 

Republican 
People’s Party 
Prohibition. 



8,240,108 


Total 


It is the business of election officers after the votes are count¬ 
ed, to ascertain the successful candidates among these four par¬ 
ties in proportion to the vote of each. If there are fifteen to be 
elected, then any party casting one-fifteenth of the total vote is 









- 12 — 


entitled to one candidate; 8,240,106 divided by 15, gives 549,340. 
This quotient, 549,340, is the “electoral quotient,” or “unit of rep¬ 
resentation,” that is, the number of votes entitled tb one repre¬ 
sentative. Each party ha,s as many representatives as it has 
“units,” and in case there are remainders, the party having the 
largest remainder gets the odd candidate. The calculation is as 
follows: 

Democrat. .3,910,390 divided by 549,340, equal 7, Remainder 165,010, Electing 7 

Republican. ...3,808,791 “ " 549,340, “ 7, “ 63,411, “ 7 

People’s Party... 328,392 “ “ 549,340, “ 0, “ 228,392, “ 1 

Prohibitionist'.... 192,533 “ “ 559 , 340 , “ o, “ 192,533, “ o 

14 15 

The Peoples’ pa,rty, having the largest remainder above a full 
quotient, is entitled to the odd elector, making the complete rep¬ 
resentation 7 Democrats, 7 Republicans and one Populist. 

It now remains to ascertain the individual candidates of each 
party who are successful. This is done, not by,taking the fifteen 
individuals whose votes a,re highest, but by taking the seven high¬ 
est Democrats, the seven highest Republicans, and the one high¬ 
est Populist. I have indicated these by asterisks. They are the 
first three, the sevenh, the tenth, eleventh arid twelfth candidates 
on the Democratic ticket; the first six and the eighth on the Re¬ 
publican ticket and the first, on the Populist ticket. 


JUSTICE FOR VOTERS AND CANDIDATES. 

By this method of counting the votes there are eight Demo¬ 
crats defeated, who by the method of the general ticket would 
have been elected, since each of them had individual votes higher 
than those of the seven Republicans and the Populist who were 
elected. It is sometimes objected that this would be unjust to 
these eight Democrats, but it must be remembered that we are 
aiming, first of all, to do justice to the VOTERS, not to the can¬ 
didates. The voters want representation according to their num¬ 
bers and their politics. They do not vote primarily for CANDI¬ 
DATES, but for PARTIES. Tliis is shown by the fact that nearly 
every voter casts a “straight ticket,” i. e., a party ticket, no mat¬ 
ter who the candidates are. In the second pla,ce, justice is done 






—13— 


to the candidates WITHIN THE PARTY by electing those who 
stand highest. A moment’s reflection will show that in the pro¬ 
portional method of counting the votes, what is really done is to 
transfer the votes given for candidates who have the least chance 
of election to those candidates of the same party who have the 
best chance of election. It is in this way that the vdtes of the 
second and third parties are saved from being wasted. The Re¬ 
publican voters and the Populist voters get their share of repre¬ 
sentation (as nearly as possible with fifteen to be elected), and the 
Democrats get no more than their share. And in every case they 
elect those among their own candidates who are the leaders. This 
is justice to the voters and justice to candidates. 


OBJECTS SECURED BY PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

By the foregoing method of election by Proportional Repre¬ 
sentation, three objects are secured: 

1. Equal rights of all political parties. 

2. Rule of the majority. 

3. Election of leaders instead of heelers. 

I.—EQUAL RIGHTS OF ALL POLITICAL PARTIES. 

The first object has already been described. Equal rights of 
all political parties are secured only when each party has repre¬ 
sentation according to its numbers. If one voter is reallv to be 
made equal to any other voter, then a group of voters joining to¬ 
gether in a party must be able to elect as many representatives 
as another group of the same size, and larger groups must elect 
a larger number in the same proportion. We have already seen 
how unfair is the present district system in its representation of 
parties. The first object of proportional representation is to cor¬ 
rect these inequalities, and it needs no further argument to show 
that the system proposed would do so. 

II. RULE OF THE MAJORITY. 

The majority should rule. But what is the majority? Is it 
a mere count of heads picked up here and there from discordant 



14- 


interests by skillful card shufflers? Is it not rather the prevail¬ 
ing opinion of the people formed out of conflict of opinions and 
interests? There are majorities and majorities. A majority of 
heads may not be a majority of opinion. The method and ma¬ 
chinery by which that majority is gotten together is a,n essential 
part of the definition of the majority. In our machinery of gov¬ 
ernment certain fundamental rights, as stated in the constitu¬ 
tions, cannot be modified except by a two-thirds or three-fourths 
vote, or by successive majorities secured after overcoming leg¬ 
islative obstacles designed to postpone a, vote until the popular 
demand becomes overwhelming. Majorities secured by this ma¬ 
chinery tend to be well matured and considerate of the minority 
and to represent the increasing, permanent conviction of the peo¬ 
ple. But within the limits laid down by the constitutions as thus 
amended, an entirely different mechanism prevails. Here our ma¬ 
chinery of election with fixed tenure of office, turns over to a syn¬ 
dicate for two, four or six years, the enactment, repeal and en¬ 
forcement of laws. This syndicate gets its authority from a mere 
numerical majority, and this majority is brought together by 
means of an ingenious “platform” of a dozen or more dovetailed 
“planks,” some large, some small and some slipped in between 
the cracks, no one of which would hold a majority, but each of 
which will attract a section of the voters. This “majority” is ut¬ 
terly artificial, incongruous and fragile, and does not represent 
the well considered opinion of the people on each separate issue. 
It is the work of clever speculators, like the sham buildings of a 
world’s fair, to be broken down as soon as the crowd goes home. 
When the crowd is gone the speculators do what they please with 
the timbers and the gate receipts. If each plank of a party plat¬ 
form were voted upon separately, the platforms would break into 
pieces, and planks of the defeated party would often be supported 
by a majority, the same as planks of the successful party. Ma¬ 
jorities secured in this way would be real majorities, because ea,ch 
issue would be decided separately on its own merits, and the plank 
would have to be broad and safe enough to bring together peo¬ 
ple whose diverse interests would usually keep them from coming 
together on other planks. The majority would not be merely a 
majority of heads, but would be the common opinion of people 
w'ho differ on other issues, and who, by agreeing on this issue, 


—15- 


give evidence that it has been so revised and broadened by long 
discussion that minorities will not suffer from the decision. 

REFERENDUM AND INITIATIVE. 

The object of the referendum and initiative is exactly this: 
To break up party platforms and to let the people vote upon each 
important question apart from all other questions. The object is 
to get real majority rule—the rule of public opinion in place of 
the rule of a political organization. This is the first and vital 
reform before the American people. The referendum is the peo¬ 
ple’s veto. The political syndicate, elected on a mosaic platform, 
cannot hold together if the people have power to veto its acts 
one by one. 

But the referendum is not enough to secure government by 
the people. It is a veto on unpopular laws, but not a means of 
getting popular laws. Even the initiative does not secure 
progressive legislation. It enables a small fraction of the 
voters to draft a bill and submit it to their fellow vot¬ 
ers without consulting the law-making body. But the bill must 
get a majority to carry it. A majority is not usually satisfied 
with a measure drawn up to suit a small fraction. A majority 
can be secured only by uniting voters whose opinions and inter¬ 
ests are different. A bill which suits a minority must be amended 
and broadened to bring in the majority. The initiative furnishes 
nc means for amendment through deliberation and conference be¬ 
tween these different interests. Such a conference can be brought 
about only by assembling the representatives and spokesmen of 
the several interests in the community. This is proportional rep¬ 
resentation. To understand the place of proportional representa¬ 
tion in a program of reform we need to understand the real ob¬ 
ject of representative government. 

AMERICAN THEORIES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERN¬ 
MENT. 

The American system of government was originally a com¬ 
promise between two theories of representation; representation 
of states and representation of persons. The senate is composed 
of two members from each state, regardless of population, and 


— 16 — 


the house is composed of members proportionate to the number 
of voters in each state. In both cases it is designed to protect 
minorities, while securing strong central power. The president 
and the supreme court guarantee centralization and power, and 
are therefore not representative of the people. But congress is 
the representative branch, a,nd it is so organized as to protect each 
section and class. The senate protects small stages and sparsely 
settled sections against the large states and the densely settled 
sections. The house protects minor classes and interests against 
the despotism of the larger interests. Ea,ch is based on an idea of 
equality; the senate on the equality of states, the house on the 
eauality of men. Both ideas are in a sense artificial, for states 
are not equal a,nd men are not by nature equal. But who can 
tell how great a state or an individual may become with a fair 
chance? Democracy means equal opportunity for stages, sections 
and individuals. 

This can be guaranteed only when each section or individual 
has an effective voice in government. This is true majority rule— 
not the suppression of the minority by the majority,\ but the 
right of the minority to be consulted. The final decision, belongs, 
of course, to the majority, but a majority compelled to argue with 
a minority, is different from a majority that meets no opposition. 
It may change its mind or modify its plans. There is no leg¬ 
islation which cannot be improved. Every bill passes through a 
stage of amendment. Majority rule means the right of the minor¬ 
ity to argue for amendments, and the right of the majority to 
decide. 

III. ELECTION OF LEADERS INSTEAD OF HEELERS. 

The Representative Should Be An Expert Adviser. 

But Democracy must act through agents. Even the so-ca,lled 
direct Democracy, where the people vote directly on laws, must 
have agents to execute and interpret the laws. Furthermore, it 
must have agents to frame these laws. Legislation is a science 
and an art, like any profession. The law maker should be an ex¬ 
pert, like the lawyer, the physician, the minister, the architect, 
the cook or the skilled artisan. A law so awkwardly framed that 
i< does not fit in with other laws brings confusion, delay and in- 


-17- 


justice. But the law-maker should not be the law-giver. He 
should be the expert adviser and not the despot. The lawyer, the 
physician, the minister, the architect, are experts, but their cli¬ 
ents decide for themselves whether they will adopt their expert 
advice or even select another expert. The referendum is the vot¬ 
er’s means of accepting or rejecting the laws recommended by 
his law maker, and the popular election of representatives is his 
means of selecting his expert advisers. This is representative 
government. 


THE VOTERS SHOULD HAVE FREEDOM OF CHOICE. 

The essence of representative government, however, is free¬ 
dom of choice. If the citizen is not free to elect whomsoever he 
chooses to govern him, then self-government gives way to despot¬ 
ism or paternalism. Representative government may be even 
more despotic than monarchial government if the people are not 
free to choose their representatives. 

A republic becomes a,n empire or a plutocracy, not by chang¬ 
ing its name or its form, but by yielding to a boss, or a general, 
or a corporation, the selection of its representatives. This is 
done in different ways. The general does it by conquest. The 
boss and the corporation do it by buying votes and manipulating 
elections. In either case the voters are not free to choose. Ev¬ 
ery step towards, representative Democracy has consisted in free¬ 
ing the mass of voters from unfair advantages of the few. Brib¬ 
ery laws and Corrupt Practice Acts check the power of wealth 
in elections. Civil Service Reform prevents the use of offices for 
bribes. Primary Election laws give the rank and file a voice in 
the party organization. The referendum keeps the boss from 
“delivering the goods” to the corporations after election, and 
thereby lessens his funds before election. Each of these reforms 
is necessary, but they are all negative. They fetter the boss and 
the private corporations but do not displace them. They do not 
secure representative government—they only lessen the evil of 
unrepresentative government. They do not cure the disease, they 
only soften the pain. To cure the disease the voters must be free 
to select better doctors. This they cannot do, because the meth- 



- 18 - 


od of plurality election restricts tlieir choice. It is the object of 
proportional representation to secure this freedom of election. 
The term proportional representation is misleading, because it 
seems to imply mainly minority representation. But this is not 
the main object of the reform. The term describes fairly well 
the method of the reform, but the electoral object has been bet¬ 
ter described by the late Dorman B. Eaton as “Free Voting,” and 
by Miss Spence, of Adelaide, as “Effective Voting.” 


ORIGINAL METHODS OF SECURING FREEDOM OF CHOICE. 

To understand the significance of this reform in representa¬ 
tive government we need to get back to first principles and to 
inquire into the social conditions out of which representative gov¬ 
ernment originated. These conditions were found in the free cit¬ 
ies of the Middle Ages. The free cities were at first private busi¬ 
ness corporations of merchants, peddlers, and hucksters, chap¬ 
tered by the king in order that they might manage th«rr private 
affairs ana might travel over the king’s highways free from inter¬ 
ference of the feudal lords. The corporation of merchants elect¬ 
ed a president whom they called their maire. After a while, in 
one way and another, the different trades of hand workers, such 
as weavers, armor-makers, shoe-makers, and so on, afiSo organized 
their own corporations and elected their own presidents, whom 
they called ealdormen. These aldermen met together as a kind 
of Trades Assembly, or Central Labor Union, or Board of Walk¬ 
ing Delegates, and finally demanded and secured a veto on the 
mayor. In this way the city became a representative govern¬ 
ment, in which the merchants were represented by their presi¬ 
dent, the mayor, and the labor unions by their several presidents, 
the Board of Aldermen. Each had a veto on the other, and there¬ 
fore the consent of each was necessary to enact laws and ord¬ 
inances. 

Now notice the method of election. Neither the mayor nor 
the aldermen were elected by universal suffrage. Each was elected 
by the members of his own corporation or trade union. Each rep¬ 
resented frankly and openly, not “all the people,” like the mod¬ 
ern politician, but his own organized interest. The mayor spoke 



—19— 


for the merchants just as much as Chauncey M. Depew spoke as 
president for the stockholders of the New York Central railway. 
Each alderman spoke and voted for his union, just as much as 
P. M. Arthur speaks for the Locomotive Engineers and Frank P. 
Sargent for the Locomotive Firemen. The city business could 
not be conducted unless the mayor and the aldermen agreed, just 
as the New York Central railway could not carry on business un¬ 
less Mr. Depew had an understanding with Mr. Arthur and Mr. 
Sargent. And just as the stockholders in the Central railway do 
not vote in the elections of the labor unions, and the engineers 
and firemen do not vote in the meetings of the stockholders, so the 
merchants did not vote for the aldermen, and the hand-workers 
did not vote for the mayor. The system was a representation of 
interests, not a representation of individual voters. 

It was with this form of city constitution that the liberties 
and the parliaments of Anglo-Saxon governments were fought for 
and won. Parliament was originally only a national convention 
or mayors, aldermen, attorneys, and head men, representing the 
merchants and hand-workers of the several corporations. This 
convention met at intervals in order to “parley,” to pass resolu¬ 
tions and to send up petitions to the king and his grand council, 
just as the American Bankers’ Association or the National Asso¬ 
ciation of Manufacturers, or the American Federation of Labor, 
nowadays holds its annual convention and sends petitions to the 
president and congress. The small farmers also had their Na¬ 
tional Farmers’ Grange and Farmers’ Alliance. Latterly, when 
these small farmers and these merchants and hand-workers felt 
the heavy hand of kings a,nd nobles, they began to hold joint 
conventions a,nd to send up joint petitions. Lastly, these peti¬ 
tions became “bills,” and the king was prohibited from violating 
them without the consent of those who sent them up. Thus a 
national convention became a “parliament,” and a* mutual veto 
became established in the nation, as it had already been estab¬ 
lished in the cities. The result is known as constitutional gov¬ 
ernment in the place of absolutism. 

Today we can see history repeating itself. Representative 
bodies—Congress, legislatures, Boards of Aldermen—are becom¬ 
ing less and less competent and representative, just as the king 


— 20 —■ 


and his grand council ha,d ceased to represent the people. And, 
on the other hand, private oragnized interests are gaining polit¬ 
ical power, just as the guilds of merchants and hand-workers 
gained power. These two movements should be carefully studied 
and understood. 


HOW VOTERS HAVE LOST FREEDOM OF CHOICE. 

The decay of representative bodies has come about through 
universal suffrage. As long as each corporation elected its own 
representative in its own meeting, by itself, it could elect its truly 
representative men. But when all classes of voters—capitalists 
and laborers, Catholics and Protestajits, educated and ignorant, 
natives and foreigners, whites and blacks—are thrown into one 
district or ward and are commanded to elect one man who shall 
represent all, plainly, they can elect only a colorless candidate 
who represents none. A ward boss informed me .that his hardest 
job was to find a candidate who would suit both the negroes along 
the canal and the professional men on the hill in his ward. Of 
course, neither the negroes nor the professional men got rep¬ 
resentation. They both ha,d either to take the candidate whom 
the boss gave them, or permit the success of the opposing party, 
which suited them still less. And that opposing party also had 
iL boss and its compromise candidate. True representation in 
this case would have been secured if the negroes could have se¬ 
lected their own aldermen and the professional men their own. 


WHO ARE THE REPRESENTATIVE MEN? 

To get back to first principles of representative government, 
(historically as well as logically), each diverse interest should be 
permitted to assemble by itself ajid elect its spokesman. The 
negroes would then elect Booker T. Washington; the bankers 
would elect Lyman J. Gage and J. Pierpont Morgan; the trusts 
would elect S. C. T. Dodd and J. B. Dill; the railroads would elect 
Chauncey M. Depew; the express companies Platt; the trade 
unions would elect Samuel Gompers and P. M. Arthur; the clergy 




— 21 — 


would elect, Archbishop Ireland and Dr. Parkhurst; the universities 
would elect Seth Low and President Eliot. These are the types 
of men with whom representative government originated. They 
are today REPRESENTATIVE men in the true meaning of the 
word. As long as representative government enlisted such men it 
was brilliantly successful. But scarcely one of these men could 
today be elected by popular suffrage and majority vote in those 
limited wards or districts where they happen to sleep. Their ad¬ 
mirers are scattered throughout the city or state. It is only com¬ 
promise and colorless men who can get majorities in the wards 
and districts—men who have few enemies because they have no 
backbone—men who are outspoken for no interest, and who, for 
that very reason, are the tools of special interests. Such men are 
kindly furnished to the voters by the boss, and they are his tools. 
Consequently, representative government has decayed, and the 
irresponsible boss ha,s emerged, because no device has yet been 
discovered by which we can return to the original principle of 
representation of interests on the higher level of universal suf¬ 
frage. 


THE MODERN ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS. 

But at the same time, this original principle is unconsciously 
forcing its way forward. There is no social movement of the past 
twenty years more quiet nor more potent than the organization 
of private interests. No other country in the world presents so 
interesting a spectacle. Almost every trade, industry and profes¬ 
sion has its national association and its state, county and city as¬ 
sociations and conventions. Every city has its chamber 'of com¬ 
merce composed of the associated capitalists; its Trades Assem¬ 
bly, composed of delegates from the laborers; its several associa¬ 
tions of clergymen, ministers, lawyers, scientists and engineers. 
Lastly, where the struggles of competition have been severe these 
associations in both city and nation have taken on a more com¬ 
pulsory organization, in the form of pools, corporations, trusts 
and labor unions. 



— 22 — 


THE LOBBY MORE REPRESENTATIVE THAN THE LEGIS¬ 
LATURE. 

This new grouping of interests is brought about for several 
reasons; partly as the natural association of those with common 
ways of thinking; partly to lessen destructive competition among 
the members; partly to control legislation and politics. It is in 
the last mentioned object that these private associations and cor¬ 
porations have developed the lobby, a n d the lobby is b^th a cause 
and a result of the decay of representative government. The lobby 
is now the unofficial but controlling factor in legislation. At the 
same time it is, in the original sense of the word, more repre¬ 
sentative than the legislature. Each interest is represented in its 
lobby by its ablest spokesman. They are freely chosen without 
dictation from bqsses or outsiders. The corporations select their 
own lobbyists just as they select their attorneys. The labor 
unions have their “legislative committees” and have established 
their national headquarters at Washington. There is also the 
liquor lobby and the temperance lobby; the school teachers’ 
lobby and the woman suffrage lobby; the insurance lobby and the 
bankers’ lobby; the permanent lobby and the casual lobby; the 
lobby eloquent and the lobby silent; the lobby vith cash and the 
lobby with votes. 

These various lobbies struggle among themselves to control 
the legislature, just as the medieval lobbies struggled to get con¬ 
trol of the king and his grand council. The shrewdest or 
wealthiest wins. If, now, these lobbies were officially recognized 
and legalized; if they were all thrown into one body and required 
to fight for control according to published rules of order, we should 
have almost the exact steps by which the House of Commons 
originated. Such a movement is already taking place in our cities. 

The Merchants’ Association of New York has become a defi¬ 
nite factor in the city government. It held up the Ramapo con¬ 
tract, which had been adopted by the Board of Aldermen, pend¬ 
ing an investigation by its own engineers, and finally secured leg¬ 
islation protecting the city. The Merchant’s Association of San 
Francisco actually carried through the reconstruction of the city 


— 23 — 


chapter. Everywhere the Trades Assembly, composed of delegates 
elected by labor unions, has a growing influence on city 'wages, 
city hours of labor, and labor legislation in general. 

MODERN REPRESENTATION BASED ON EQUALITY OF 

THE VOTERS. 

But it will at once be seen that a modern project for repre¬ 
sentation of interests exactly parallel to that of medieval times 
cannot be admitted. First, in the medieval system, there was no 
recognized equality of voters. The representatives stood for cor¬ 
porations, and the large corporations had no larger number of 
votes than the small corporation. Today, with universal suffrage 
and equal rights of man, representation must be proportional to 
the extent of each interest. Second, there is a large number of 
voters, perhaps a majority, who are not members of any organ¬ 
ized interest. In medieval times a man had no political rights ex¬ 
cept as he gained them through membership in a legalized cor¬ 
poration. But today he has the suffrage as a man, and not as a 
member of the guild. Consequently, a,s such, he is entitled to 
representation. Representation of interests cannot be merely rep¬ 
resentation of ORGANIZED interests—it must also include the 
unorganized. 

Furthermore, medieval interests were rigid, and the corpora¬ 
tion or guild absorbed the whole life of the man and his family. 
But modern interests are fluid and transitional. Membership can 
be changed from one to another. 

For these reasons the voter must be permitted readily to shift 
his vote from one interest to another. In other words, while the 
organized interests should be permitted to elect their avowed rep¬ 
resentatives without interference, the unorganized voters should 
be permitted, not to defeat the candidates of the organized inter¬ 
ests, and so to force compromise candidates upon the voters, as 
at present, but to elect their own representatives, or to add their 
weight to the representation of one interest or another, as they 
choose. This end can be reached by “free nomination” and “free 
voting.” Free nomination is simply nomination by petition. Free 
voting is simply the provision that a minority shall have repre¬ 
sentation proportionate to its numbers. 

This is proportional representation. 



- 24 - 


LEADERSHIP MORE IMPORTANT THAN EQUALITY. 

The election of the true leaders of the people is the most im¬ 
portant object of proportional representation. Government can 
be efficient and public-spirited even when large sections of the 
people are unrepresented, but it utterly fails when corrupt men 
or insignificant men are in office. Critics of proportional repre¬ 
sentation have given their attention solely to its object of secur¬ 
ing equal representation. They have been misled by the mere 
title “proportional” or “minority” representation. They have as¬ 
sumed that this is the only object. But this is only secondary. Its 
main object is to accomplish in the legislative branch of govern¬ 
ment what civil service reform is intended to accomplish in the 
administrative and executive branches. The effort to introduce 
civil service reform is the effort to take appointive offices out of 
the hands of political bosses and make appointees strictly servants 
cf the public. 

But civil service reform reaches only appointive offices. Far 
more important are the elective offices. These are the sources of 
power, and if they were properly filled there might be no need of 
“civil service reform.” Now the power of the bosses and profes¬ 
sional workers in controlling elections, depends just as much on 
the method of election as it does on the privilege of awarding the 
appointive offices. Our electioin methods are such as to shut out 
all candidates who do not have the sanction of the “organiza¬ 
tion.” They must come in, if at all, as “independents,” as “citi¬ 
zens’ union,” or as other forms of “third parties.” Proportioinai 
representation is intended to go to the very root of the matter 
and to revise the method of election so that the strong and^popu- 
lar leaders of the people can be elected without first visiting the 
boss and getting his “0. K.” 

To get truly representative men elected to office, each group 
of voters with the same interests should be allowed to meet by 
itself, that is to say, should have the suffrage limited to its own 
members. It could then elect its ablest men. The merchants and 
manufacturers should hold their own election and they could 
easily elect their most respected business man. The bankers by 
themselves, could elect their leading financier. The school teach- 


- 25 — 


ers and professors in their own convention could elect their lead¬ 
ers. So with the lawyers and physicians, if they were each al¬ 
lowed to hold their own private election. The clergy separated 
into the Catholic group and the Protestant group, could easily se¬ 
lect a representative man from each. The labor unions would elect 
the same men they now elect as their presidents and secretaries. 
In fact, it is plain that in ajl public and private elections the 
really representative men are not aldermen and congressmen, but 
are those who now are elected as officers in the various private 
associations. 


VOTES WOULD NOT BE THROWN AWAY. 

This is similar to what would occur with proportional rep¬ 
resentation. Ward and district lines would be broken down. 
Voters of the same interests and beliefs would be permitted to 
come together according to their likings. They would nominate 
their own candidates exactly as they now elect the officers of their 
private associations. All of the candidates nominated by all the 
different parties, or groups of petitioners, would be placed upon 
a general ticket. Instead of a, choice narrowed down to the two 
candidates of the two leading parties, where only one could be 
successful, there would be five, ten, twenty or fifty choices, ac¬ 
cording to the number of single districts which have been merged 
into one general district. There would continue to be, as at pres¬ 
ent, two or three times as many candidates nominated as could be 
elected, but those who are elected would not be limited to the one 
majority party. Every voter would know that less than a ma¬ 
jority would elect. (Consequently, he would feel in no danger of 
tiirowing his vote away. If there were twenty to elect, then one- 
twentieth of the voters, voting for the same group of candidates, 
are certain of the election of the leading candidate in the group. 
Their votes for the lesser candidates are not thrown away, but 
are transferred and counted for the one who best represents this 
twentieth part of the voters. If the number of voters in the group 
is two-twentieths, they elect their two leading candidates, and so 
on. Every party among the voters is represented in proportion 
tc the number of votes which it casts, and in every case by its 



— 26 - 


loading candidates. There is no interference from outside. There 
is no wire pulling and manipulating in order to hit upon a* can¬ 
didate who can command a majority. Every group of voters is 
as free as though it held its election in a hall by itself. 


REPRESENTATION OF ALL THE PEOPLE. 

This is what I call representation of interests. But it is the 
representation of ALL interests on a democratic basis. 

Proportional representation is nothing more nor kiss than a 
simple mathematical device for representing all interests in pro¬ 
portion to their numbers. It elects the kind of men who stand out 
as strong leaders of each interest. It brings these men together 
in the municipal council, the state legislature, the federal con¬ 
gress, each the recognized spokesman of a different body of vot¬ 
ers, each owing his election only to those voters, each certain of 
re-election as long as he truly represents them, 6ach wholly in¬ 
dependent of dictation from any boss or “organization” which 
might displace him. Such men can look forward to a life career 
as legislators. They can become experts in their profession just 
a* a physician or a lawyer.in his. But their profession will not 
consist in manipulating the primaries, conventions, elections and 
party machinery, as at present. They will give almost no time 
to these preliminaries. Their work will be wholly that of the ex¬ 
pert adviser in shaping and the re-shaping the laws which the 
people want. This is the true business of legislators. 


OBJECTIONS ANSWERED. 

'*9 

The main objection raised against proportional representa¬ 
tion is that it would admit all sorts of petty theorists, eccentric 
reformers and revolutionists to the legislature, as well as the rep¬ 
resentatives of corrupt interests; that it would break up political 
parties into factions, each working for its own selfish interest, 
and entering upon deals and log-rolling with other factions, re¬ 
gardless of the welfare of the nation as a whole. This would de- 




-27- 


stroy the responsibility of a majority party for perverse laws and 
for the defeat of wise laws, and would weaken the government. 

This objection overlooks the true aim of representative gov¬ 
ernment. The legislature, or the congress, is not the administra-< 
tive branch of government, but is a deliberative body. Here the 
people come together in order to frame laws that snail guide the 
executive and the judicial branches. An absolute monarchy is 
not troubled by such interference, and those who wish to turn the 
deliberative branch of a republic into an administrative branch, 
are infected with the old ideas of absolutism. If a deliberative 
body does not represent all the people, it is, just so far, a kind 
of absolute government. Who will say that an absolute govern¬ 
ment is stronger than a representative one? Every individual, 
or class of individuals, kept out of a share in government, be¬ 
comes either an enemy to government, or indifferent to good gov¬ 
ernment. If a nation is unfortunately composed of half angels and 
half devils, then its representative assembly should be half arch¬ 
angels and half boss-devils. The devils would gain by association 
with the angels and the angels would be forced to give the devils 
a hearing. But the American people are not so easily classified. 
It has very few angels and not many devils. The great majority 
are well meaning and patriotic. The revolutionists, fanatics and 
corrupt elements are insignificant. They are worse than they 
would be if their leaders were admitted to a share in the nation’s 
deliberations. 

If the above objection is advanced as a defense of the exist¬ 
ing system it is singularly blind. Factions have greater power 
for evil now than they would have with proportional representa¬ 
tion. In an election by plurality vote, districts are usually close, 
and a very small number of voters hold the balance of power. 
Possibly 5% of the voters can be bribed by money. This 5% is 
often enough to turn the election in every district. But with pro¬ 
portional representation they could elect only 5% of the candi¬ 
dates, and their influence would be so small that it would not 
pay the parties to buy them. At"present, a small, compact, fac¬ 
tion can force a candidate to make concessions. With propor¬ 
tional representation it could only put up its own candidate and 
would lope its balance of power in the election. 

Factions also have greater power in congress and the legisla- 


— 28 — 


tares than they would have with proportional representation. 
The majority party is itself made up of factions. There are beet 
sugar Republicans and reciprocity Republicans. The Republican 
party needs the votes of all its factions to keep its majority. This 
enables the beet sugar faction to “hold up” the entire congress 
by merely holding up the majority party. So it is with all fac¬ 
tions. The majority party can overcome its factions only by mak¬ 
ing them all subordinate to the political boss. This is the natural 
outcome of the system of party rule. It succeeds only by sup¬ 
pressing representation of all interests. This throws power into 
the hands of a single interest. This one interest is that of the 
politicians and the corporations.. These alone have the money to 
meet the enormous expenditures for election and alone have those 
gifts of shrewdness, cunning and manipulation required to work 
the machinery. All of the plain and busy citizens, occupied daily 
with legitimate industry and professions, are at a disadvantage. 
The system inevitably gets into the hands of those who expect to 
make money out of it, and can give their time to it. What is 
wanted is a system whereby the common people, with all their 
varying interests, can just as easily get their share of representa¬ 
tion as they can now attend a convention or circulate a petition. 

But there is a positive answer to this argument. Possibly 
three-fourths of the voters are not closely tied to any party or 
interest. So diversified is modern industry and so easily do in¬ 
dividuals change from one station to another, that there is a 
large majority ready to vote for those moderate and conservative 
candidates who hold the balance between extreme partisans. Such 
voters have no place in the present system, which represents only 
partisans, and consequently they make up that large stay-at-home 
vote which can employ only this method of defeating.its discred¬ 
ited leaders. Proportioinal representation gives these voters an 
opportunity to put up their own candidates and get their share 
of representation. While it would be true that certain organized 
interests, like politicians, bankers, corporations, labor unions, 
would be represented by their leaders, yet these number not' more 
than 20% of the voters. The unorganized laborers are 90% of the 
wage-earning classes, and their interests are as often with their 
employers as with the organized unions. The professional classes, 
lawyers, ministers, physicians, teachers, as well as the clerks and 


- 29 — 


»T ' ‘ 

the great body of farmers, have interests in all directions. They 
help to make up the balance wheel of popular government. They 
do not vote for partisans unless compelled to do so by our plu¬ 
rality system, which narrows their choice down to the two par¬ 
tisans dominated by the politicians. Proportional representation 
gives them an opportunity to vote for broad-minded men not 
identified with party or factional interests. 

Proportional representation is indeed the very counterpart of 
universal suffrage. Universal suffrage introduces a diversity of 
interests into the electorate and gives a political voice to that 
large majority whose interests are in good government rather than 
party advantage. Proportional representation guarantees that 
this voice shall be heard a,nd its wishes respected. 


PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION IN THE ELECTION OF 

COMMITTEES. 

Voluntary associations, like labor unions, corporations, clubs, 
are representative democracies in miniature. Every time a presi¬ 
dent or secretary is elected, every time a committee is appointed, 
the representative principle is invoked. These officers guide the 
association. They initiate its policy. They often have power to 
commit their fellow members to lines of action without their pre¬ 
vious consent. They are called upon to decide for and against 
individuals in important matters. 

With such powers, and acting in such representative capacity, 
it is important that they really represent the entire association. 
This is especially true in organizations with vital interests at 
stake, like la,bor unions, whose success depends upon aggressive 
work and harmony of the membership. If any section of the 
members feels that it is being worked against by the officers, dis¬ 
affection or luke-warmness follows, and if there is not disruption 
there is at least failure to win outsiders. Any one familia,r with 
unions knows that their strength or weakness turns on their offi¬ 
cers and executive committees. The usual difficulty is that a lead¬ 
ing faction elects all the officers and the minority ha,s no effective 
voice in the administration. At every election there is a hot 



struggle between the factions. Much preliminary time is wasted 
in this domestic strife. Bad feeling is created. Factionism is 
easily fomented. Employers take advantage of the dissensions. 
Only harsh necessity forces, the minority to yield, and even then 
there remains an element of weakness. 

Now if it were possible to make the officers and committees 
an exact reflection of the membership, then all factions and in¬ 
terests would be represented by their leaders. An electioin device 
of this kind was developed some years ago in a reform society at 
Cleveland, Onio, under the lead of Dr. L. B. Tuckerman. This 
society, being composed of trade unionists, socialists, single-tax¬ 
ers, and populists, naturally ha,d serious internal difficulties. 
Ihese difficulties nullified practical action whenever an attempt 
was made to influence the public through the press or to influence 
the city administration. Whenever a committee was appointed 
or elected it was found that one or another faction had the en¬ 
tire membership. The other factions at once repudiated its acts. 
But when the device of proportional representation, or “prepond¬ 
erance of choice,” was adopted, each interest found its own rec¬ 
ognized leaders on the committees, and thereafter successful co¬ 
operation was secured. The method adopted by the society is 
about as simple and as quickly operated as the usual method of 
voting, and therein has an advantage over the more cumbrous 
forms of proportional representation which have been enacted 
into law in various countries. It consists simply in requiring each 
voter to vote for as many candidates as the number to be elect¬ 
ed in the order of his preference. This can be indicated either by 
the figures 1, 2, 3, etc., or simply by the order in which the names 
are written on the ballots. Then the tellers in counting the votes 
do not' simply count one for each name, but they count as ma,ny 
tallies for the first name as the number to be elected. They count 
one less tally for the second name, and so on until the last name, 
for which they count but one tally. For example, suppose a com¬ 
mittee of five is to be elected, and nine candidates are dominated. 
Below I inuicate the supposed ballots of three voters with the pre¬ 
ponderance of weight as given by each. (Of course the voter does 
not mark the tallies; he simply indicates his order of preference, 
and the tellers attend to marking the tallies on the tally sheet.) 


Ballot I. 
A x i i i i 
B i 111 
C i 11 
D ix 
E i 


Ballot II, 

F 11 i i i 

G i 111 
A I I I 
D i i 
B i 


Ballot III 
H 11 111 
I i x i i 
Bin 

G i i 
F i 


After the ballots a,re taken up the tellers proceed to arrange 
a tally sheet and then to call off and write down the number of 
tallies from each ballot for each candidate, as follows. The five 
candidates having the largest number of tallies are elected. 


A 111 11 

i i i 

= 8 elected 

B i 11 i 

i 

iii =8 elected 

C i 11 


= 3 

D i i 

i i 

= 4 

E i 


.:= i 

F i i 11 i 


i=6 elected 

G i i i i 


ii=6 elected 

H i i i i i 


= 5 elected 

I i i i i 


= 4 


It will be seen that by this method voter No. 1 is represented 
by his two leading candidates, A and B; voter No. 2 is represent¬ 
ed by his two leading candidates, F and G, and by two others, A 
ana B, who stood third and fifth on his ballot. Voter No. 3 is 
represented by his leading candidates, and by three others, B, G, 
and F, who stood lowest in his preference. Supposing these three 
voters to be typical of three factions, it will be seen that each fac¬ 
tion is fairly represented on the committee by its leading mem¬ 
bers. 

So far as the voter is concerned there are but two rules to be 
observed. The first is that he must vote for at least two-thirds 
of the number to be elected. Otherwise, his ballot is void. If all 
voted for but one they would defeat the object and would prac¬ 
tically return to the old system of majority instead of propor¬ 
tional representation. 

The second rule is that the voter must indicate his order of 
preference. This is plain. 

The foregoing holds for committees. Of course, where one 
candidate is to be elected, like the president or secretary, propor¬ 
tional representation does not apply. The majority elects its can¬ 
didate, and that is the end of it. But in some cases the practice 
obtains of election by plurality, wherein the candidate who gets 
the largest number of votes is elected, regardless of whether he 
has a majority of all. In either case, there is strife and dissatis- 


—32 


faction. Tliis can be largely obviated by permitting as many nom¬ 
inations as are desired and then permitting the voters to indicate 
both their first and second choices. The tellers in this case, count 
first, the first choices, and if one candidate gets a majority of all 
he is elected. But if no one has a majority of first-choices, the 
tellers proceed to take the ballots of the one who stands lowest, 
and who therefore has no chance of electioin, and to re-distribute 
his ballots according to the second choices. They continue in 
this way, taking from the lowest candidates until but two candi¬ 
dates remain. Tne one of these having a majority is elected. 
The plan is simple enough, the only precaution being that when 
the first choices are counted the ballots shall be sorted in piles 
according to tne first-choice candidates. It is then a simple mat¬ 
ter to take up and re-distribute the ballots of the lowest candi¬ 
dates. 

This plan provides a method of weighing the choices of the 
voters as accurately as is possible, where but one is to be elected. 

The objects claimed to be promoted by the foregoing methods 
of election in labor unions and other voluntary associations are 
summarized as follows: 

1. Representation of all groups or factions in proportion to 
their significance. This is justice and equality to all the mem¬ 
bers. 

2. United and harmonious action and healing of factional 
strife. This is preparation for aggressive work. 

3. Object lesson of true representative democracy for the 
election of public officials for city, county, state and nation. 


- 33 - 


APPENDIX L 


PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SUCCESSFUL IN 
SWITZERLAND AND BELGIUM. 

The method of election recommended by the American Pro¬ 
portional Representation League, is that now in force in Switzer¬ 
land and Belgium. It is a modification of our general ticket, 
it is voted in exactly the same way as the general ticket, and 
is therefore perfectly simple, as far as the voter is concerned. It 
can be explained by the following illustrative ballot, where nine 
candidates are to be elected: 

ILLUSTRATIVE BALLOT—NINE TO ELECT. 

Democratic Voter Casts Nine Votes for His Party and Two Indi¬ 
vidual Votes, Showing Preference for G and H. 


Rep 

Dem. 

X 

People’s. 

Silver Rep. 

Soc. I,abor. 

A 

F 

K 

M 

P 

B 

G x 

M 

N 

Q 

C 

Hx 




D 

I 




E 






The above illustrative ballot is framed on the assumption that 
each of the five parties nominates its own ticket independently 
of the others. The letters A, B, C, etc., stand for the names of 
candidates. Each party or group of voters could nominate an en¬ 
tire ticket of nine candidates if so desired, but naturally, each 
nominates only one or two more than it expects to elect. Nomina¬ 
tions are made by petition or by convention. 










—34— 


THE VOTER. 

Each voter can vote in one of two ways, exactly as he does 
with the present Australian ballot. 

1. He can vote a “straight ticket” by marking the space un¬ 
der the title of his party. In this case he gives his nine votes to 
his party as a whole. At the same time he can indicate his pref¬ 
erences for individual candidates on his party ticket, if he desires, 
but is not required to do so. For example, in the above ballot, a 
Democratic voter has given nine votes to the Democratic party 
and has indicated his preferences for G and H. 

2. The second method of voting is to vote a “split ticket.” 
In this case the voter ma.rks the names of individual candidates 
on several tickets. His nine votes, instead of being plumped for 
one party, are distributed among the different parties, and at the 
same time they count as preferences for individual candidates. 

It will be seen that the a,bove method of voting is precisely 
the same as that of the Australian ballot. As far as the voter is 
concerned, if he can vote the present secret ballot, he can vote 
this form of Proportional Representation. The only new feature 
introduced is in COUNTING the votes. This is not done by the 
voter, but by the election officers, a,nd the law specifies clearly the 
steps to be taken. 

COUNTING THE VOTES. 

The election officers determine first, the number of votes cast 
l’or each party, and second, the number cast for each candidate. 
The party vote of each party is the total of the “straight votes” 
plus the individual votes on the split tickets. After this is as¬ 
certained it is only a matter of addition and division to determine 
the number of candidates elected by each party. Assuming in 
the above election, where nine are to be elected, that the vote was 
cast as shown in the following table, then each party would elect 
candidates as also shown in the table. 


- 35 - 


Candidates 

Party Votes Elected. 

Republican. . .. ... 4000 electing 4 

Democrat ... 2000 “ 2 

People’s. . 1000 “ 1 

S. Rep. . 1000 “ 1 

Soc. Dab... 1000 “ 1 


After each party’s share of representation is determined the 
final step is to discover which candidates are elected by each 
party. Plainly they are those whose individual votes are 
highest. For example, the Democrats having nominated four, but 
having elected only two, it is necessary to arrange the candidates 
in the order of their individual votes, as follows: 

INDIVIDUAL VOTES, DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES. 


Candidates. 

Votes. 

Result 

F 

500 

elected 

G 

600 

elected 

H 

300 

fill first vacancy 

I 

100 

fill second vocancy 










- 38 - 


shall be severally divided by the unit of representation, and 
each such ticket shall be entitled to a number of aldermen 
equal to the quotient thus obtained, ignoring fractions. 

3. If the sum of such quotients be less than the number* 
of persons to be elected, the ticket having the largest remain¬ 
der after the division aforesaid, shall be entitled to an addi¬ 
tional alderman; thereafter, the ticket having the second 
largest remainder; and so on, until the whole number is 
chosen. 

Sec. 7. When the number of representatives to which each 
ticket is entitled shall have been determined as provided in Sec¬ 
tion 6, the candidates upon such tickets who shall have received 
the highest number of votes (not exceeding the number of repre¬ 
sentatives to which such ticket is entitled) shall receive certifi¬ 
cates of election. In case of a tie between tickets or candidates, 
the lot decides. 

Sec. 8. If a ticket obtains more representatives than it has 
presented candidates, the number of seats remaining to be filled 
is distributed among the other tickets in proportion to the votes 
cast for each. 

Sec. 9. When there is a vacancy in any seat, the candidate 
who has received in the general election the greatest number of 
votes after the last one elected, in the party or group within which 
the vacancy has occurred, is chosen to fill it. 


(THE END.) 



% 


LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



0 029 041 844 6 


\ 










